SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THIRD CIRCUIT LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent Third Circuit cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing we
hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-AFRMATIvE ACTION POLICIES-AN EMPLOYER THAT PREFERS MINORITY EMPLOYEES OVER
NONMINORTY

EMPLOYEES IN MAKING LAYOFF DECISIONS VIO-

LATES ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS WHEN THIS PREFERENCE WAS
NOT PURSUANT TO AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLAN DESIGNED TO

REMEDY PAST DISCRIMINATION-Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91
F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996).
Sharon Taxman was a teacher in the business education department at Piscataway High School. See Taxman v. Board of Educ.,
91 F.3d 1547, 1551 (3d Cir. 1996). In May 1989, the Piscataway
Board of Education voted to abolish one of two teaching positions
within the department. Both Taxman and the other teacher employed there had equal seniority and qualifications. Therefore, the
Board's decision on which of the two to lay off had to be made
either by a random procedure such as a coin toss, or by reference
to some other factor. Eventually, the Board chose to terminate
Taxman, who was white, and retain the other teacher, who was
black. The retained teacher was the only black teacher in the business education department. In support of this decision, the Board
relied on its affirmative action policy, which included an objective
of promoting a culturally-diverse work force. See id. at 1551-52.
After a complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission proved unsuccessful, the Government commenced a
lawsuit against the Piscataway Board of Education in the United
States District Court for the District of NewJersey, alleging a violation of Title VII, the federal law prohibiting employment discrimination. See id. at 1552 (citing United States v. Board of Educ., 832 F.
Supp. 836 (D.N.J. 1993)). Because of a statute-of-limitations problem, the Government did not assert any constitutional claims in its
complaint. See id. at 1552 n.5. Taxman intervened as a party to the
action, seeking remedies under both the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (NJLAD) and Title VII. See id. at 1552. The district
court decided the issue of liability in Taxman's favor on a motion
for partial summary judgment, holding that the Board's decision to
terminate Taxman violated both Title VII and the NJLAD. See id.
Thereafter, the court held a trial on the issue of damages, and
Taxman was awarded over $144,000 in damages for lost pay, benefits, compensatory damages, and interest. See id.
Both Taxman and the Board appealed the decision. See id.
Taxman contended that the court erred by denying her punitive
damages, and the Board maintained that its affirmative action plan
359
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did not violate Title VII. See id. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court's decision
by an 8-4 vote. See id. at 1547. The en banc opinion was the first
pronouncement from the appeals court on this case since no opinion was ever released by the three-judge panel that initially heard
the appeal. See id.
Judge Mansmann, writing for the majority, began the opinion
by reviewing the relationship between Title VII and affirmative action policies. See id. at 1553. The court noted that since 1979,
Supreme Court precedent was clear that some voluntary affirmative action plans established by employers did not violate Title VII.
See id. at 1554 (citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 20506 (1979)). The court explained that Weber and its progeny had
held that for an employer's affirmative action plan to comply with
Title VII, it had to satisfy two criteria. See id. at 1553. Accordingly,
Judge Mansmann set forth the two-pronged test from Weber that
would govern Taxman's case: first, the plan had to mirror the purposes of Title VII, and second, it could "'not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the [nonminority] employees.'" Id. at 1554-55.
The Third Circuit then began its analysis for considering the
validity of the Board's plan, focusing on the first prong of the Weber
analysis-whether the affirmative action plan mirrors the purposes
of the statute. See id. at 1556. Judge Mansmann explained that one
of the purposes of Title VII, as evidenced from its legislative history, was to end certain forms of employment discrimination. See
id. at 1557. Another purpose of Title VII, the Third Circuit noted,
was to remedy past segregation and underrepresentation that
members of minority groups suffered in the workplace. See id. In
contrast, the court declared that promoting racial diversity among
teachers for the sake of improved education was not one of the
enunciated goals of Title VII, either in its original version or in
amendments to that statute. See id. at 1558-59.
The majority also rejected the Board's arguments that
Supreme Court Equal Protection Clause precedent validated the
affirmative action plan here. See id. at 1559-62. In support of this
conclusion, Judge Mansmann stressed that the frameworks for
cases arising under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause had
significant differences between them. See id. at 1559 (citing Johnson
v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 627-28 n.6 (1987)). The
court concluded its analysis under the first prong of the Weber test
by stating that a plan without a remedial purpose would be an unlawful violation of Title VII because a valid affirmative action plan
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had to "mirror" the objectives of Title VII. See id. at 1563. Since
the Board had adopted the plan to obtain educational benefits
from a racially-diverse faculty, and not to remedy past discrimination, the majority found that the plan failed the first prong of the
Weber test.. See id.
Next, the Third Circuit considered the second prong of the
Weber analysis-whether the affirmative action plan before the
court "unnecessarily trammels" the interests of nonminority employees. See id. at 1564 (citing United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 208).
Judge Mansmann sharply criticized the lack of specificity in the
Board's affirmative action policy. See id. The majority stated that
the policy lacked objectives or benchmarks of any kind, whether
numerical or otherwise. See id. The result of this, the court
opined, was to vest the Board with standardless discretion over
when to apply the policy. See id. The majority also observed that
the application of the policy in this case caused a great harm to the
nonminority employee in question-namely, loss of a job. See id.
The court therefore concluded that these two factors-the lack of
the policy's specificity and the career disruption from Taxman's
job loss-caused the Board's policy to also fail the second prong of
the Weber test because it "unnecessarily trammeled" the interests of
nonminority employees. See id. at 1565.
Completing its analysis of federal law, the court next explored
Taxman's claims under the NJLAD. See id. Judge Mansmann explained that the legal analysis for NJLAD cases and Tide VII cases is
"essentially the same." See id. Accordingly, the Third Circuit stated
that the Board's liability is the same under either the NJLAD or
Tide VII. See id.
Next, the court considered the damages issues raised by the
Board of Education. See id. According to the majority, the district
court correctly awarded Taxman one hundred percent of the pay
she would have received had the Board not fired her. See id. at
1565-66. The process of calculating a lost compensation award is
one in which a trial judge exercises significant discretion, and
Judge Mansmann found that the trial court had not abused its discretion. See id. at 1566. The court then determined that prejudgment interest, calculated by the "adjusted prime rate," a figure set
by the federal government, was appropriate. See id.
The majority also found that the trial court acted correctly in
dismissing Taxman's claims for punitive damages under the
NJLAD. See id. at 1567. According to the court, a plaintiff seeking
such an award must show that the defendant acted in an especially
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egregious manner, including the commission of wanton, reckless,
or malicious acts. See id. at 1566-67. The court agreed with the
district court that the Board's acts here did not meet the high standard necessary to receive punitive damages. See id. at 1567.
Finally, the court observed that the Board's goal of racial diversity was not objectionable. See id. The majority stated, however,
that discrimination against nonminorities was the means chosen to
achieve that goal, and if the goal was something other than remedying past discrimination against minorities, then such a plan
would violate Title VII. See id. Thus, the Third Circuit affirmed the
district court's judgment in its entirety. See id.
Judge Stapleton issued a concurring opinion. See id. at 1567
(Stapleton, J., concurring). The judge stated that based on the
court's finding that the plan lacked remedial purpose, it was unnecessary to decide whether the Board's plan unnecessarily trammeled Taxman's rights. See id. The judge agreed, however, with
the remainder of the court's opinion. See id.
Chief Judge Sloviter, joined by Judges Lewis and McKee, filed
the first of four dissenting opinions. See id. (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Sloviter explained that in the two instances
where the Supreme Court had upheld affirmative action plans,
both of those plans were remedial or corrective in nature. See id. at
1569-70 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). The chief judge opined, however, that it was illogical to conclude that just because those two
validated plans had remedial or corrective purposes, such purposes
were a condition precedent to the legality of any affirmative action
plan. See id. at 1570 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
The chiefjudge stated that the Supreme Court had repeatedly
recognized the value of racial and ethnic pluralism, especially in
the public education context. See id. at 1572 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). Thus, Chief Judge Sloviter found that the majority erred in
refusing to recognize the goal of promoting diversity as a purpose
that would validate an affirmative action plan. See id. at 1574
(Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). The chiefjudge also concluded that the
Board's plan did not "unnecessarily trammel" the rights of the
nonminority employees, stressing that the plan could be used as a
"tie-breaker" to make decisions only in the rare case where all
other factors were truly equal. See id. at 1575 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). Accordingly, the chiefjudge stated that the trial court should
have validated the plan and granted summary judgment to the
Board. See id. at 1576 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
Judge Scirica, joined by Chief Judge Sloviter, issued a separate
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dissenting opinion. See id. (Scirica, J., dissenting). The judge expressed agreement with much of the majority's opinion, but proclaimed that cases involving education should be treated
differently. See id. Judge Scirica explained that diversity in education is important because "'[a] great deal of learning occurs . . . through interactions among students of both sexes, of
different races, religions, and backgrounds.'" Id. (quoting University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 n.48 (1978)).
Moreover, the judge stated that the Board's actions did not prefer
a less-qualified minority teacher over a more-qualified minority
teacher. See id. at 1576-77 (Scirica, J., dissenting). Rather, the
judge explained that faculty diversity was only considered after all
else was found to be equal, and that such a decision was permissible under the framework of Title VII. See id. at 1577 (Scirica, J.,
dissenting).
Judge Lewis also dissented separately, in an opinion joined by
Judge McKee. See id. (Lewis, J., dissenting). The dissent illustrated
its disagreement with the majority's views by using two hypothetical
examples in which an employer, exercising its discretion and prerogatives, chooses to retain a minority employee over a nonminority employee where all other factors are equal. See id. at 1577-78
(Lewis, J., dissenting). Judge Lewis proffered that the majority's
approach indicated that any such decision process would be impermissible. See id. at 1578 (Lewis, J., dissenting). The judge opined
that the majority's approach was inconsistent with the purposes of
Title VII of eliminating stereotypes and misconceptions, and accordingly, dissented. See id.
Finally, Judge McKee authored a dissenting opinion joined by
Chief Judge Sloviter and Judge Lewis. See id. (McKee, J., dissenting). The judge emphasized that the Board's motivation in terminating Taxman instead of the other teacher was motivated by a
desire to expose students to people from different backgrounds.
See id. The judge deferred to the Board's judgment that students
exposed to such diversity become more tolerant and open-minded,
and that this was a positive educational objective. See id. Judge McKee suggested that such practices were entirely consistent with Title VII. See id. Thus, the judge declared that the Board's desire to
achieve greater diversity was consistent with Title VII, and did not
violate the statute. See id. Finally, the judge observed that racial
differences within the United States tend to divide society, but that
actions like those taken by the Board helped to control this problem by promoting respect for diversity. See id. at 1579 (McKee, J.,
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dissenting). Therefore, Judge McKee concluded that the Board's
actions were consistent with that goal and should have been upheld because Title VII was meant to help integrate the country. See
id.
In Taxman, a local governmental body, the Piscataway Board
of Education, determined that bigotry and prejudice might be curtailed within its school system through a more diverse faculty.
Many other institutions of learning in the United States have
reached the same conclusions as the Piscataway Board of Education, as illustrated by the widespread use of curriculum and policies
designed to encourage diversity. More importantly, as Chief Judge
Sloviter's dissent pointed out, the Supreme Court has reached similar conclusions in cases decided under the Equal Protection
Clause.
In light of this legal and policy background, the majority's decision should have identified increasing diversity as one of the
goals of Title VII. Moreover, the majority should have concluded
that Piscataway's plan did not "unnecessarily trammel" Sharon
Taxman's rights. It must be remembered that Piscataway's plan
could never elevate a less senior or less qualified minority employee over a nonminority employee who was more qualified for
the job. Instead, it was to be used only in cases where all else was
equal. The plan was to be utilized only in the rarest of circumstances, and thus, could not reasonably be said to trammel the
rights of nonminority employees. This unfortunate decision by the
Third Circuit will therefore have the effect of impairing even modest efforts by employers to increase diversity in their workforce.
Flavio L. Komuves
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New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1996).
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tion and education of illegal aliens, the State of New Jersey sued
the United States government. See New Jersey v. United States, 91
F.3d 463, 465 (3d Cir. 1996). The complaint alleged that because
the federal government failed to adequately patrol its borders and
enforce its own immigration laws, NewJersey spent $212.5 million
of its own tax revenues to incarcerate and educate illegal aliens.
NewJersey based its right to compensation on the following federal
constitutional and statutory grounds: 1) the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986; 2) the Invasion and Guarantee Clauses;
3) the Tenth Amendment and other claims of state sovereignty; 4)
the Naturalization Clause; and 5) the Takings Clause. See id. at 466.
The State filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey. See id. The district court, granting the federal government's motion to dismiss, held that the claims
presented by New Jersey were nonjusticiable political questions as
well as unreviewable pursuant to the Administrative Procedures
Act. See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heard the case on appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See id.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the district court,
agreeing that New Jersey's effort to compel the United States to
reimburse it for funds expended on illegal aliens was a nonadjudicable political question as well as unreviewable under the Administrative Procedures Act. See id.
Chief Judge Sloviter, joined by Judges Sarokin and Oakes, began the opinion by pointing out that five similar cases had been
adjudicated in the district courts of other states and all had been
dismissed. See id. at 465, 466. Furthermore, the chiefjudge noted,
the two cases that reached other circuit courts also found for the
United States. See id. at 466. The court then analyzed NewJersey's
claims that it was entitled to remuneration from the federal government under the United States Constitution. See id.
The court first considered New Jersey's argument that it was
entitled to relief from the United States under the Tenth Amendment. See id. The chiefjudge noted the State's argument that the
federal government's failure to enforce its own immigration laws
effectively precluded NewJersey from exercising its Tenth Amendment right to decide how to spend its tax revenues. See id. In finding this Tenth Amendment argument insufficient, the court
observed that United States Supreme Court jurisprudence only required that Congress could not compel a state's legislature to
adopt and carry out a federal legislative scheme. See id. Chief
Judge Sloviter explained that the instant case presented a different
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situation because Congress did not mandate that New Jersey educate and incarcerate illegal aliens. See id. at 467. Rather, the court
observed, the State acted independently by utilizing its own laws to
prosecute unlawful aliens. See id. In addition, the chief judge articulated, New Jersey educated illegal aliens not pursuant to a federal directive, but in accordance with the Federal Constitution as
interpreted in Plyler v. Doe. See id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
230 (1982)). Finally, the court noted that inaction by the executive
and legislative branches did not amount to the type of coercion
that violated the Tenth Amendment. See id.
The court acknowledged that NewJersey's next claim for relief
fell under the Naturalization Clause, which empowers Congress to
create a uniform naturalization law. See id. The chief judge observed that the State maintained it was powerless to control the
effects of illegal immigrants and required to bear the brunt of responsibility for controlling illegal immigration that belonged to the
nation as a whole. See id. The court found that NewJersey offered
no support to render invalid a congressional exercise of power pursuant to the Federal Constitution that resulted in indirect monetary penalties. See id. Moreover, Chief Judge Sloviter stated, there
was no authority to imply an affirmative duty on the federal government to shield states from the negative effects of illegal immigrants. See id.
The Third Circuit next evaluated New Jersey's claim based
upon the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. See id at 468. The
court confronted the State's allegation that it was entitled to compensation from the United States because its expenditures to imprison and educate illegal aliens amounted to a taking under the
Fifth Amendment. See id. The chief judge pointed out there was
no authority that required the United States to compensate for an
indirect effect on a state's tax proceeds caused by the federal government's action or inaction. See id. The court further noted that
the United States Supreme Court had not articulated a clear standard under the Takings Clause, but rather approached compensation on a case-by-case basis. See id. Finally, the court concluded
that the State's expenditures on illegal aliens did not constitute a
taking for Fifth Amendment purposes. See id.
The court next moved to New Jersey's claim under the Invasion Clause. See id. This constitutional provision, the court noted,
required the government to defend the states against external invasions. See id. The chief judge explained that a remedy under the
Invasion Clause was not available to the State because it did not
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establish that the provision applied to a nonmilitary invasion. See
id. The court added that New Jersey also appeared to be making a
claim under the Guarantee Clause, which promises "every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government." d. Chief Judge
Sloviter further noted that the State failed to articulate how the
government's action compromised NewJersey's republican form of
government. See id. The court concluded that the mere expenditure of its own tax dollars did not amount to a threat to New
Jersey's republican form of government. See id. at 468-69.
NewJersey's next claim, the court acknowledged, was a generalized allegation that the federal government's inability to patrol its
own borders intruded on its state sovereignty. See id. at 469. Chief
Judge Sloviter summarily rejected this claim, noting that the State
did not cite any particular constitutional provision to support its
sovereignty claim. See id. In addition, the court observed that the
matter was better left to the procedural mechanisms of the federal
system than to judicial intervention. See id. (quoting Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985)).

The court noted that the State also advanced it was entitled to
relief because it had exhausted all other possible remedies and
there was no constitutional mechanism from which to seek remuneration. See id. The chief judge articulated that New Jersey was
referring to the United States Supreme Court's decision in South
Carolinav. Baker, which held that its prior Garcia decision may require a finding of a Tenth Amendment violation for regulation of
state activities by Congress if serious flaws existed in the national
political process. Id. (citing South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505

(1988)). The court concluded, however, that because New Jersey
did not assert any flaws in the national political process, it did not
have a valid claim. See id.
Chief Judge Sloviter next considered the district court's finding that New Jersey's claims were nonadjudicable political questions. See id. The court observed that three of the six factors that
determined the existence of a political question announced in
Baker v. Carrwere present in New Jersey's claims. See id. (citing
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). The court explained that
the Naturalization Clause represented a constitutional issue committed to the realm of Congress. See id. Next, the chief judge advanced that judicial intervention was inappropriate because the
ability to control the borders of the United States remained solely
within the power of the federal government. See id. Finally, the
court noted that judicial meddling into the State's constitutional
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claims was both disrespectful to the court's fellow branches of government, and inappropriate because the court lacked the ability to
resolve them. See id at 469-70.
Lastly, the court determined the viability of New Jersey's federal statutory claims. See id. at 470. The court first observed that
the State's claim under the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1365, was not judicially determinable
because the statute reserved sole discretion of fund disbursement
to states for prosecution of illegal aliens to a federal administrative
agency under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701,
702. See id. The Third Circuit briefly discussed Lincoln v. Virgil,
relied upon by the district court, which involved a challenged determination by the Indian Health Service to end the Indian Children's Program. See id. (citing Lincoln v. Virgil, 113 S. Ct. 2024
(1993)). The chief judge explained that the pertinent statutes in
Lincoln generally authorized the Service to expend appropriated
congressional funds on programs to assist Indians, relieve distress,
and conserve health. See id. Under these terms, the court stated,
the Supreme Court found that an agency has nonreviewable discretion in deciding the allocation of appropriated funds. See id. at
471.
The chiefjudge noted that NewJersey's argument that Lincoln
did not apply was flawed. See id. The court stressed that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1365 did not require the Immigration and Naturalization Service
to disburse funds to the states. See id. Furthermore, the court concluded that if Congress sought to mandate disbursement of funds
to the states, then it would have done so. See id.
The court's decision was a proper one from ajudicial perspective. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the result wasjust.
The federal government has a constitutionally delegated responsibility to patrol its borders and maintain the sovereignty of the nation. If the government finds this task unmanageable, then the
least it should do is ensure that the states are remunerated for the
costs associated with educating and incarcerating illegal aliens.
The court's distinction between federal governmental actions and
omissions does not justify placing the burden of illegal immigration on the tax purses of the several states. Therefore, Congress
should mend this financial wrong by mandating state
compensation.
Rocco Luisi
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SENTENCING-SPECIAL PAROLE-FOLLOWING THE REVOCATION OF
A PAROLEE'S INITIAL TERM OF SPECIAL PAROLE MADE PURSUANT
TO 21 U.S.C. § 841(c), THE UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION MAY NOT REINSTATE SPECIAL PAROLE, AS PER 28 C.F.R.
§§ 2.52(b) AND 2.57(c), BUT RATHER IT MAY ONLY IMPOSE THE
NON-INCARCERATIVE SANCTION OF TRADITIoNAL PAROLE-Fowler

v. United States Parole Comm'n, 94 F.3d 835 (3d Cir. 1996).
In April 1986, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York sentenced the defendant-appellant Kevin
Fowler (Fowler) to a two-year prison term, to be followed by a sixyear term of special parole pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841 (c), for the
distribution of illegal drugs within a specified distance from a
school. Fowler v. United States Parole Comm'n, 94 F.3d 835, 836 (3d
Cir. 1996). Upon his release from incarceration in May 1990,
Fowler commenced his term of special parole.
In April 1992, the United States Parole Commission (the Parole Commission) rescinded Fowler's initial term of special parole
due to his drug use, failure to contact his probation officer, and
breach of the conditions of a drug aftercare requirement. The Parole Commission then ordered Fowler to serve additional time in
prison prior to reparole, and did not credit him with the time he
spent on special parole. See id. at 836-37.
In early 1993, Fowler was again released from prison and
placed on special parole. See id. at 837. Due to Fowler's continued
drug use, an additional violation of the drug aftercare requirement, and criminal possession of a controlled substance, however,
the Parole Commission ordered him to serve thirty-two months in
prison without credit for the time served on special parole, after
which he would be reparoled. The National Appeals Board affirmed this decision.
Fowler then filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus
with the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.
See id. He premised his petition on the argument that 21 U.S.C.
§ 841 (c) provided no authority for the Parole Commission's imposition of a second and third term of special parole following its
revocation of his initial term. See id. The district court denied
Fowler's application, concluding that the Parole Commission maintained jurisdiction over Fowler subsequent to rescinding his initial
term of special parole. See id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court.
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See id. at 841. The Third Circuit instructed the lower court to confer upon Fowler a conditional writ of habeas corpus and then remand the matter to the Parole Commission for continued
proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Third Circuit. See
id. The court held that the Parole Commission, while maintaining
jurisdiction over Fowler pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841 (c), could impose only the non-incarcerative sanction of traditional parole after
initially revoking his special parole, notwithstanding promulgated
regulations to the contrary. See id. at 836.
Judge McKee, writing for the unanimous panel, first asserted
that the courts of appeal have offered differing interpretations of
21 U.S.C. § 841 (c), which has since been repealed but remains in
effect for offenses committed prior to November 1, 1987. See id. at
837 & n.1 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(c) (1982)). The judge acknowledged that some federal appellate courts had determined that the
Parole Commission lacked the necessary authority under the statute to reimpose special parole as punishment subsequent to revocation of the initial term of special parole. See id. at 837. Certain
other circuits, the judge noted, had realized the opposite conclusion. See id.
Endorsing the former interpretation of the statute, the panel
next discussed the meaning of the word "revoke" under the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (3), a similar statute dealing with the
nature and terms of supervised release following the initial revocation of parole. See id. at 837-38 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (3)
(1988 & Supp. IV)). The court, relying on a previous decision that
interpreted § 3583(e) (3), determined that "revoke" meant to
"cancel or rescind," and as applied in the instant case had the force
of disallowing the reimposition of additional terms of special parole after initial revocation. See id. at 838 (citing United States v.
Malesic, 18 F.3d 205, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1994)). The panel determined that while revocation denied the reimposition of an additional term of special parole, it did not affect the Parole
Commission's retained jurisdiction over the parolee. See id.
Continuing with its interpretation of § 841 (c), the court next
concluded that Congress expressly conferred to the Parole Commission the power to release a person in violation of his term of
special parole and to continue supervision of that release. See id. at
839. Additionally, the panel asserted that § 841 (c) affords the special parole violator re-release and allows him to serve the remainder of his sentence of incarceration among the public. See id. The
court noted that central to its ruling was the determination of the
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nature of that supervised release, thus leading to a consideration of
the differences between "traditional" and special parole. See id. at
839-40.
Judge McKee briefly traced the history of "traditional" parole
in the United States, beginning with its inception in 1876 at the
New York State Reformatory for Juveniles. See id. at 839. "Traditional" parole, the judge posited, is simply a release from prison
prior to the expiration of the full prison sentence, whereby the
parolee must abide by the rules of society that condition his release
for the balance of that sentence. See id. The judge recounted that
special parole, however, is a statutory creation, deriving its authority from Congress, and that if imposed, applies additional time following the release from incarceration. See id.
The judge noted that special parole differs from "traditional"
parole in three respects: (1) special parole is subsequent to the
term of incarceration, while "traditional" parole provides for release before the term has expired; (2) the district court judge, not
the Parole Commission, initially imposes special parole and the
terms and conditions thereof; and (3) upon revocation of special
parole, its entire length then becomes a term of incarceration, with
street time having no mitigating effect on its duration. See id. at
83940. The judge then declared that the non-incarcerative custody as permitted by § 841 (c) qualifies as "traditional" parole because it is included in the mandated sentence, not additional to
that term of imprisonment. See id. at 840.
The judge stated that § 841 (c) vests neither a district court nor
the Parole Commission with the express authority to reimpose a
term of special parole. See id. The panel then refuted the Parole
Commission's argument that the practice of revoking special parole and later reinstating it was long "understood" under previous
law and should remain an available option. See id. Commenting
that § 841 (c) welcomes the reimposition of "traditional" parole.,
but not special parole, the court agreed with the Parole Commission that non-incarcerative custody remains a viable option. See id.
The panel confirmed that § 841 (c) indeed does provide special parole violators a period of release under their newly-imposed term
of incarceration, but this release is nothing more than "traditional"
parole, not special parole. See id. The court cautioned that "a practice bottomed upon an erroneous interpretation of the law is not
legitimized merely by repetition." Id.
The panel next examined the Parole Commission's reliance
on two regulations, 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.57(c) and 2.52(b), for the au-
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thority to reimpose special parole. See id. at 840-41 (quoting 28
C.F.R. §§ 2.57(c), 2.52(b) (1995)). While noting the considerable
deference due to the regulations, the court found that the Parole
Commission's reliance on those regulations as the governing interpretation of § 841(c) was misplaced. See id. at 841. Judge McKee
again confirmed that § 841 (c) was not so vague as to lend credence
to the Parole Commission's interpretation of its regulations. See id.
The court determined that the regulations' apparent authorization
of the reimposition of special parole directly conflicted with
§ 841 (c) and must relent to the statute's force and effect. See id.
Finally, the court rejected the Parole Commission's reliance
on a recent congressional amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h),
which grants sentencing courts the authority to reimpose terms of
supervised release after initial revocation, as indicative of congressional intent in § 841 (c) with regard to special parole. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) (1994)). Stating that the congressional
intent of § 3583(h) should not be forced upon the construction of
§ 841 (c), Judge McKee concluded the court's analysis and instructed the Parole Commission, upon remand from the district
court, to either impose an additional term of traditional parole if
Fowler's term of supervision had not yet terminated, or release him
if his term of supervision had lapsed. See id.
The Parole Commission's damning practice of reimposing a
parolee's special parole post-revocation would have been left unchecked were it not for the courage of Kevin Fowler. The court's
stern stricture that "a practice bottomed upon an erroneous interpretation of the law is not legitimized merely by repetition," sounds
the death knell for such a misguided practice. Id. at 840. Clearly,
by chiding the Parole Commission, the court is silently championing both the plight of the "system-battered" prisoner and the often
fatuous bureaucratic habit of acting on some misperceived statutory interpretation simply because "it has always been understood"
to be interpreted in a certain way. See id.
Because special parole is a supervised release in addition to
the initial term of incarceration, it is imperative that its issuance
not be abused. Hence, the court's ruling clarifying § 841 (c) arrests
the confusion surrounding the imposition of "traditional" and special parole and corrects the Parole Commission's misconception.
See id. at 839-41. One who is released following service of the maximum period of supervision and is subsequently subject to special
parole should not be unduly exposed to repeated "punishment"
that is unfounded in the congressional intent of the statute, overt
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or otherwise. According to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, additional parolee post-release violations may be
sanctioned by the revocation of special parole, additional incarceration, and thankfully, nothing more.
Daniel G.P. Marchese

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-POLICE OFFICERS CAN
BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATING A PERSON'S SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS IF IT is FOUND THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE OFFICERS INCREASED THE PERSON'S RISK OF HAi-Kneipp v. Ted-

der, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996).
On the evening of January 23, 1993, Samantha and Joseph
Kneipp attempted to walk home after having drinks at a local tavern. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1201 (3d Cir. 1996). According to Mr. Kneipp, his wife, Samantha, was intoxicated to such
an extent that "she smelled of urine, staggered when she walked
and, at times, was unable to walk without assistance." Less than a
block from their apartment, Police Officer Wesley Tedder stopped
the couple for causing a disturbance. Shordy after Officer Tedder's arrival on the scene, three additional police officers arrived
and parked their cars across the street. See id. at 1201-02. Mr.
Kneipp approached the other police officers, informed the officers

that he was in a rush to get home, and asked for permission to
leave. See id. at 1202. The officers allowed Mr. Kneipp to leave,
and he returned home, leaving his wife with the police officers.
According to Mr. Kneipp, he presumed that the officers were
going to assume responsibility for his wife's safety because she was
obviously intoxicated and in need of assistance. Joseph testified at
trial that when the officers permitted him to continue home without his wife, he assumed that the officers were either going to take
his wife to the police station or to the hospital. See id. at 1202-03.
Contrary to his expectations, the officers did not take Mrs. Kneipp
to the police station or the hospital, but instead allowed her to walk
home unescorted. See id. at 1202.
Mrs. Kneipp never made it to her apartment. Later that same
evening, police officers found Mrs. Kneipp unconscious in an embankment across the street from her apartment building. See id. at
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1203. Mrs. Kneipp's overexposure to the cold caused her to develop a condition known as anoxia. As a result of this illness, Mrs.
Kneipp developed permanent brain damage, which rendered her
incapable of performing many basic bodily functions.
Mrs. Kneipp's legal guardians instituted a suit against several
police officers and the City of Philadelphia. The complaint against
the police officers alleged that the actions of the officers placed
Mrs. Kneipp in greater danger. The plaintiffs maintained that the
police officers acted with reckless disregard for Mrs. Kneipp's safety
by allowing her to continue walking home unsupervised. The complaint filed against the City of Philadelphia alleged that the City
acted in reckless disregard for Mrs. Kneipp's safety by its custom,
practice or policy of not giving its police officers adequate incentive to bring intoxicated persons into custody. The plaintiffs also
contended that the City of Philadelphia had not sufficiently trained
its police officers regarding the proper procedure on how to care
for individuals under the influence. See id. at 1203-04 Consequently, the plaintiffs argued that both the City of Philadelphia
and the officers who approached Mrs. Kneipp violated her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights and her personal security liberty interest. See id. at 1204.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. See id. The district court found that the plaintiffs failed to
establish a constitutional violation. See id. According to the district
court, the plaintiffs could not sustain a cause of action under either
the "state-created danger theory" or the "special relationship test."
See id.
Plaintiffs submitted a timely notice of appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. See id. Applying the
"state-created danger" theory, the Third Circuit held that the facts
alleged would be sufficient to prove a prima facie case that Mrs.
Kneipp's substantive due process rights and liberty interest in personal security had been violated. See id. at 1211. The court stated
that the facts, if proven, would tend to show that the actions of the
police officers increased the risk of harm that ultimately resulted in
Mrs. Kneipp's injuries. See id. Therefore, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment ruling. See id. at
1213-14.
The Third Circuit, in an unanimous opinion authored by
Judge Mansmann, began its discussion by explaining the development of the "state-created danger" theory. See id. at 1204. Judge
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Mansmann noted that this theory was first articulated in Deshaney v.

Winnebago Co. Dep't of Social Serv. See id. (citing Deshaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)). The judge posited that the Supreme Court in Deshaney considered whether the
state had an affirmative duty to protect an individual against private actions of a third party when there was a special relationship
between the state and the individual. See id. The judge further
elucidated that, according to the Deshaney Court, an adequate special relationship exists between the state and an individual where
the state takes an individual into involuntary custody. See id. at
1204-05.
Judge Mansmann asserted that there was no special relationship between Mrs. Kneipp and Officer Tedder. See id. at 1205. The
court, however, explained that the Deshaney decision left open the
question of whether a special relationship is necessary in a situation where the state created the danger. See id. Judge Mansmann
then cited opinions from otherjurisdictions that acknowledged the
state-created danger theory as support for establishing a constitutional violation. See id. The judge noted that, prior to Mrs.
Kneipp's complaint, the Third Circuit was never supplied with the
proper factual situation that would justify a finding of liability
based on the state-created danger theory. See id.
The Third Circuit outlined the four elements that must be established to find constitutional liability under a state-created danger theory. See id. at 1208. The first element, the court stated, is
that the injury suffered by the plaintiff must have been foreseeable
and fairly direct. See id. Second, the court expounded, the conduct of the state actor must evince a willful disregard for the plaintiff's safety. See id. Third, Judge Mansmann explicated, there must
exist some type of relationship between the state and the plaintiff.
See id. Lastly, the Third Circuit proclaimed that state actors must
use their authority to create an opportunity for harm that would
not have otherwise existed. See id.
The court then proceeded to apply the facts of this case to
these four common elements. See id. Judge Mansmann first determined that Mrs. Kneipp's injuries were foreseeable because her
muscular coordination must have been visibly impaired, given her

blood-alcohol content. See id. Second, the court proffered that the
plaintiffs' adduced enough evidence to raise an issue as to whether
the police officer acted with willful disregard for Mrs. Kneipp's
safety. See id. Third, the judge opined that a reasonable juror
could find that the relationship requirement was met because of
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the level of control that the officer exerted over the plaintiff. See
id.
The court stressed that a reasonable jury could find that the
final element had also been established. See id. at 1209. Judge
Mansmann reasoned that prior to the officer's intervention, Mrs.
Kneipp was being escorted to her apartment by her husband. See
id. The judge proffered that in allowing Mr. Kneipp to proceed
home without his wife and then sending her home unescorted, the
police officers' conduct could be found by a reasonable jury to
have increased the plaintiffs vulnerability to injury. See id. The
court posited that the evidence submitted was adequate to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the actions of the police officers affirmatively placed Mrs. Kneipp in a position of
greater danger than had the officers not intervened. See id. Thus,
the Third Circuit concluded that the district court erred when it
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. See id. at
1211.
The Third Circuit then turned to the plaintiffs' claim against
the City of Philadelphia. See id. The court outlined the plaintiffs'
argument that the City of Philadelphia violated Mrs. Kneipp's due
process rights in two respects. See id. First,Judge Mansmann noted
that the plaintiffs alleged that the City violated Mrs. Kneipp's rights
by failing to adequately train its police officers. See id. Second, the
judge stated that the plaintiffs claimed that the City's long-standing
policy or practice of failing to give its police officers adequate incentive to bring intoxicated persons into custody violated Mrs.
Kneipp's due process rights. See id.
The court responded by setting forth the applicable standard
for assessing the City's culpability. See id. The Third Circuit announced that in order to prove liability, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the City's policy or a custom evidenced a "deliberate
indifference" to her constitutional rights. See id. at 1212. Judge
Mansmann continued by explaining that a "policy" is established
when a decision maker announces an official proclamation with
respect to the action in question. See id. The court further stated
that a "custom" is established when the practice at issue is so well
settled that it is virtually considered law. See id.
Judge Mansman then explained that the finding of an unlawful custom or policy does not end the inquiry. See id. at 1213. The
judge pointed out that the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the
injuries sustained were proximately caused by the City's unlawful
policy or custom. See id. In order to satisfy this requirement, the
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court explicated, the plaintiff must show a "plausible nexus" or "affirmative link" between the City's custom and the violation of Mrs.
Kneipp's Fourteenth Amendment rights. See id.
After setting forth this standard, the Third Circuit decided not
to make a decision on its applicability to the facts of this case. See
id. The court remanded the case to the lower court for a determination on three issues. See id. First, Judge Mansmann stated that
the district court must decide whether the City inadequately
trained its police officers in the care of intoxicated persons. See id.
Second, the judge reasoned that if a deficiency in training was
found to exist, it must be determined whether the City was indifferent to that deficiency. See id. Lastly, the Third Circuit explained
that the district court will have to determine whether the deficiency was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. See id.
The Third Circuit correctly held that the Due Process Clause
protects an individual against a state actor who, through his actions, increased that individual's risk of bodily injury. The
Supreme Court ruled in Deshaney that it would be unjust to place
an affirmative duty on state actors to protect persons from all
outside forces. The Court implied, however, that the state does
have the duty to refrain from taking action that will place the party
in a worse position than the party would have been in had no action been taken in the first place. This holding sends an important
message to police officers-if they are present on the scene, at the
very least, the officers are obligated to ensure that their presence
does not exacerbate the situation.
Fruqan Mouzon

RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
(RICO) -STANDING-A

TERMINATED EMPLOYEE POSSESSES THE

STANDING REQUIRED TO SUE A FORMER EMPLOYER PURSUANT TO

THE RICO PROVISION THAT PROHIBITS CONSPIRACIES TO EFFECTUATE VIOLATIONS OF OTHER RICO PROVISIONS, DESPITE THE
EMPLOYEE'S LACK OF ACTUAL HARM AS A RESULT OF SUCH VIo-

LATIONS-Rehkop v. Berwick Healthcare Corp., 95 F.3d 285 (3d
Cir. 1996).
On October 31, 1994, the Berwick Healthcare Corporation
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(Berwick) terminated its employment of Robert A. Rehkop
(Rehkop), a Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist who had been
working at the Berwick Hospital Center. Rehkop v. Berwick Healthcare Corp., 95 F.3d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 1996). Rehkop had been working for the health care corporation since early 1990. Rehkop
alleged that his employment was terminated based upon his refusal
to participate in a fraudulent medical benefits claim payment
scheme conducted by his direct supervisor and another Berwick
employee.
Berwick Hospital Center is a public provider of anesthesia
services and participates in Medical Assistance, Medicare and Medicaid programs. These programs are managed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the United States. At Berwick, Rehkop
was directly supervised by the Chief Nurse Anesthetist, Alex Keris.
Additionally, David Kasputis, M.D., an anesthesiologist in Berwick's
employ, acted as the provider of anesthesia. According to Rehkop,
Keris and Kasputis collectively submitted fraudulent claims for
these services to both the state and federal programs, and in return
received payments from the programs for the covered patients.
Rehkop also claimed that Keris and Kasputis ordered him to
execute such claim forms. Upon learning of the fraudulent nature
of the claims, however, Rehkop declined to do so and he reported
the activities of Keris and Kasputis to the Vice-President of Human
Resources of Berwick Hospital Center, Henry Mandel. After hearing nothing further on the matter from Mandel, Rehkop discussed
the matter with David Matisse, the Chief Financial Officer of Berwick. Matisse informed Rehkop that he had reviewed the situation
with both the Chief Executive Officer of Berwick Hospital Center,
Thomas Spatt, and the Board of Directors of Berwick and was advised not to pursue the concern further.
As a last resort, Rehkop reported the activities of Keris and
Kasputis to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the Bureau). He
asserted that shortly after his report to the Bureau, he began receiving disciplinary actions from Keris, which were both false and
lacking any factual basis. Additionally, Rehkop encountered numerous protracted delays in his compensation for services rendered and reimbursement of other expenses. Rehkop was finally
notified by Keris on October 31, 1994, that he was fired.
Rehkop subsequently brought this action in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18
U.S.C. § 1962, against: Berwick Healthcare Corporation; the Ber-
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wick Hospital Center; Keris; Kasputis; Mandel; Spatt; the Board of
Directors of Berwick Healthcare Corporation; and the Wyoming
Valley Healthcare System, Inc. See id. at 287-88. Rehkop alleged
that these defendants collectively conspired to perpetrate and did
perpetrate mail fraud through the submission of fraudulent reimbursement claims. See id. at 288. The complaint specifically alleged that the defendants had engaged in a scheme of activity in
furtherance of the conspiracy that resulted in Rehkop's termination. See id. Rehkop's termination was allegedly effectuated in an
effort to prevent discovery of the conspiracy, as well as to impeach
Rehkop's credibility in the event that he assisted the government
in its prosecution. See id. The complaint further alleged that these
acts of the defendants fell within those "predicate acts" deemed to
violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), and that the defendants as a group
conspired to carry them out, thus violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
See id. This civil RICO claim by Rehkop was based on 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c), which allows claims to be brought for violations of'
1962(c). See id. at 288.
Each of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that
Rehkop lacked standing to sue them in a civil RICO action. See id.
The district court agreed and dismissed Rehkop's entire complaint, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b) (6). See id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
granted Rehkop's appeal to determine whether Rehkop possessed
the standing necessary to bring a cause of action under RICO. See
id. at 287. In an unanimous decision, the court reversed in part
and affirmed in part, holding that Rehkop did have standing to
bring a conspiracy action against his former employer for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). See id. The court further held, however, that Rehkop lacked standing to bring a claim for violation of
§ 1962(c). See id.
Judge Mansmann, authoring the unanimous opinion of the
court, began the court's analysis by examining the remedy available
under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). See id. at 288. The judge noted that
§ 1964(c) provides that any person who is injured as a result of a
§ 1962 violation may sue for this injury in any appropriate district
court of the United States. See id. The judge explained that to
have standing to bring a § 1964(c) claim, a plaintiff must show: (1)
that the defendant violated at least one of the subsections of
§ 1962; and (2) that this violation substantially brought about an
injury to the plaintiffs business or property. See id.
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The judge further outlined these requirements by referring to
the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L.
v. Imrex Co. See id. (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479
(1985)). Judge Mansmann observed that in Sedima, the Supreme
Court required that the injury alleged by the plaintiff must be the
direct result of a violation of § 1962. See id. In addition, Judge
Mansmann reflected on the Third Circuit's application of that
standard in Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc. See id. at 288-89 (citing Shearin v. E.F.Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1989)).
The judge noted that Shearin involved a factual situation very similar to that in Rehkop, where the employee was terminated for not
complying with a directive that violated a RICO provision. See id. at
288. Judge Mansmann observed that in Shearin, the Third Circuit
found that Shearin's injury-being fired by her employer-did not
directly result from that employer's alleged violations of § 1962(a)
or (c). See id. at 289. The judge reiterated the holding in Shearin
that if anyone had been injured by the employer's conduct, it was
the customers who had been defrauded and not the employee who
was terminated. See id.
Judge Mansmann observed, however, that although the court
in Shearin found that the employee lacked standing to sue for a
violation of § 1962(c), the terminated employee possessed the requisite standing to sue her employer for an alleged conspiracy that
violated § 1962(d). See id. at 289 (citing Shearin, 885 F.2d at 1168).
The judge noted that the actions of hiring and firing the employee
in Shearin were overt acts, which would establish a conspiracy, and
the termination of the employee could be construed as an injury
that resulted directly from a § 1962(d) infringement. See id (citing
Shearin, 885 F.2d at 1168-69). Thus, Judge Mansmann confirmed
that Shearin stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, in
accordance with § 1964(c), for a violation of § 1962(d). See id.
In applying the Shearin decision to Rehkop's claims for relief,
Judge Mansmann observed that Rehkop had not alleged any injury
that was substantially brought about by the defendant's alleged
§ 1962(c) infractions. See id. The racketeering activities supposedly conducted by Rehkop's employers were not a substantial cause
of Rehkop's loss of employment. See id. The court recognized that
those directly injured by the racketeering activities would be the
government programs that were defrauded, as well as the taxpayers-but not Rehkop. See id. As a result, Judge Mansmann concluded that Rehkop lacked standing to bring a cause of action
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against the defendants under § 1964(c) for an alleged violation of
§ 1962(c). See id.
The court next analyzed whether Rehkop had standing to
bring an action against the defendants under § 1964(c) for an alleged violation of the RICO conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(d). See id. In reversing the decision of the district court,
which held that Rehkop lacked standing to bring such a claim,
Judge Mansmann posited that the alleged violations of § 1962(c)
by the defendants would establish the underlying basis of the conspiracy under § 1962(d). See id. at 289-90. The judge found that
this satisfied the first element of an asserted cause of action under
§ 1964(c). See id. at 290. The judge further stated that if Rehkop
was harmed by the alleged conspiracy, as he was in the present case
by being fired, Rehkop would have standing to pursue a claim for
violation of § 1962(d). See id. Consequently, Judge Mansmann
held that Rehkop's claim of a conspiracy in violation of § 1962(d)
stated a valid cause of action under § 1964(c). See id.
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Mansmann acknowledged
that the Third Circuit's position disagrees with the view held by a
majority of the courts. See id. According to the judge, the majority
of courts have ruled that only injuries resulting from RICO "predicate acts" will afford the standing necessary to bring an action for
conspiracy under § 1962(d). See id. The court indicated, however,
that its hands were effectively tied, since the Supreme Court had
not yet spoken on the concern at issue in Rehkop, and the precedent announced in Shearin had not been overruled by the Third
Circuit en banc. See id. at 290-91.
The Third Circuit's decision was correct in light of the Shearin
precedent. In the Third Circuit, it has long been the tradition that
the reported decision of a panel is viewed as binding on all following panels. See id. n.8. Thus, a decision by the Third Circuit en
banc would be required to overrule a reported panel decision like
that in Shearin. See id.
The impact of the Rehkop decision on this area of the law is
uncertain. The court intimated that if this issue were to be decided
en banc, a different outcome could result. This would align the
Third Circuit with a majority of the other circuits in allowing a
cause of action for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) only if
the injury to the plaintiff was caused directly by one of the RICO
predicate acts set forth in § 1962(a)-(c). Until such time, however,
the question of whether a cause of action for conspiracy may be
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had without an injury directly resulting from one of the other provisions of § 1962 will be answered in the affirmative.
W Joseph Nielsen

